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Constitutional litigation has become a central arena for debate about human rights.
Groups from all points on the political spectrum have turned to legal advocacy,
“intervening” in judicial proceedings in an effort to advance their preferred
interpretations of particular rights.
Judges and scholars remain divided on whether and how interveners are valuable.
This paper evaluates a main rationale for intervention: interveners improve
adjudication by enriching courts’ understandings of the issues before them. We
use qualitative analysis to examine the extent to which interveners in Canada have
succeeded in contributing to judicial pronouncements on the scope and meaning
of religious freedom.
We find that interveners have been modestly successful in influencing religious
freedom doctrine. While the doctrine has not shifted radically in response to
intervener submissions, interveners have impacted several SCC decisions.
Interveners have had a more pronounced impact on a few minority judgments that
could one day become law.
Le contentieux constitutionnel est devenu une arène centrale du débat sur les
droits de la personne. Des groupes de tous les horizons politiques se sont tournés
vers le plaidoyer juridique, en « intervenant » dans les procédures judiciaires afin
de faire valoir leurs interprétations préférées de certains droits.
Les juges et les universitaires demeurent divisés sur la question de savoir si et
comment les intervenants sont utiles. Dans le présent article, nous évaluons l’une
des principales justifications de l’intervention: les intervenants améliorent la prise
de décision en enrichissant la compréhension qu’ont les tribunaux des questions
qui leur sont soumises. Nous utilisons une analyse qualitative pour examiner dans
quelle mesure les intervenants au Canada ont réussi à contribuer aux prises de
position judiciaires sur la portée et la signification de la liberté de religion.
Nous constatons que les intervenants ont réussi de façon modeste à influencer la
doctrine de la liberté de religion. Bien que la doctrine n’ait pas changé radicalement
en réponse aux déclarations des intervenants, ces derniers ont influencé plusieurs
décisions de la Cour suprême du Canada. Les intervenants ont eu un impact plus
prononcé sur quelques jugements minoritaires qui pourraient un jour devenir loi.
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Introduction
A growing body of literature documents the involvement of civil society
organizations in national and trans-national debates about the protection
of human rights.1 Rights discourse has become “a central site of normative
contestation over the implications of modernity,” with groups from all
1.
See e.g. Christopher McCrudden, “Transnational Culture Wars” (2015) 13:2 Int J Constitutional
L 434; Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); David Cole, Engines of Liberty: The Power of Citizen Activists to Make
Constitutional Law (New York: Basic Books, 2016); William N Eskridge, “Some Effects of IdentityBased Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century” (2002) 100:8 Mich L Rev
2062.
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points on the political spectrum “claiming to interpret human rights in
the ‘right’ way.”2 While civil society organizations have historically
turned to political advocacy to further their normative positions, they are
increasingly engaging in legal advocacy in the courts. In this context civil
society organizations seek to function as “norm entrepreneurs,”3 putting
forward their preferred interpretations of particular human rights to the
courts with the power to define them.
Canada has experienced its share of norm entrepreneurship in human
rights litigation. Since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, the legal procedure of intervention has allowed a steady stream
of organizations and individuals to participate in judicial proceedings
to which they are not formally parties. Apart from a short period in the
1980s, the practice of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has been to
allow almost unlimited intervener participation.4 This permissive practice
has facilitated the presentation of a wide range of arguments to Canada’s
highest court. Religious freedom litigation is one area where civil society
interveners are consistently present. In a previous study, we found that
interveners participated in all but one of twenty SCC cases addressing
religious freedom arguments between 2001 and 2018, with an average rate
of 6 interveners per case.5
Despite the high rates of intervention at the SCC, judges and
scholars remain divided on whether and how interveners are valuable
to the adjudication of constitutional and other legal claims.6 There are
two principal theories supporting intervener participation. One is that
interveners promote the legitimacy of judicial decisions by making the
court process more “open and accessible.”7 The other is that interveners
2.
McCrudden, ibid at 435.
3.
Ibid.
4.
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy,
Affiliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48:3/4 Osgoode Hall LJ 381 at 395, noting a success rate of 91.4
% for potential interveners between 2000 SCC 1 and 2009 SCC 38; Daniel Sheppard, “Just Going
Through the Motions: The Supreme Court, Interest Groups and the Performance of Intervention” in
Cheryl Milne & Kent Roach, eds, Public Interest Litigation in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada,
2019) 187, noting the success rate for intervention motions at the SCC between 2009 and 2017 ranged
from 80 to 96%; see also Ian Brodie, Friends of the court: the privileging of interest group litigants in
Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
5.
Kathryn Chan & Howard Kislowicz, “Divine Intervention: A Study of the Operation and Impact
of NGO Interveners in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation” (2019) 90 SCLR (2nd) 219, Table 2
[Chan & Kislowicz]. In this paper, our sample covers the same time period but includes only the 16
cases where the Court addressed religious freedom in its reasons. We consolidated the two appeals
involving Trinity Western University in 2018 as the interventions were similarly consolidated.
6.
See Chan & Kislowicz, ibid and the literature cited therein.
7.
Bertha Wilson, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36:3 UTLJ 227 at 243. See
also Omari Scott Simmons, “Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political
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improve the quality of judicial decisions by expanding or enriching the
court’s understanding of the issues before it.8
This paper forms part of a broader project that aims to evaluate the
strength of each of these rationales for intervener participation in cases
involving section 2(a) of the Charter. Our initial paper offered observations
on patterns of intervention in religious freedom cases at all levels of
court.9 We developed an initial typology of interveners and recorded the
numbers and kinds of interveners in these cases. Here, we undertake a
more granular inquiry into the extent of interveners’ influence on religious
freedom doctrine. Unlike previous work which has used quantitative
analysis to assess the impact of interventions on the outcome of particular
cases, we rely primarily on qualitative analysis to examine the impact
of interventions on doctrinal development. We ask: to what extent have
interveners in Canadian religious freedom litigation succeeded in being
“norm entrepreneurs” that contribute to judicial pronouncements on the
meaning and relative importance of section 2(a)?
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, we summarize the claims
of those who assert that interventions improve the quality of judicial
decisions. We consider the relationship between improving quality and
wielding influence, and outline our methods of measuring how interveners
have influenced the Court’s section 2(a) jurisprudence. In Part II, we
identify certain general indicators of intervener influence and apply them
to our dataset. We then undertake a granular, qualitative analysis of one
strong theme of the religious freedom case law—collective religious
freedom—in interventions and related SCC decisions (Part III), before
offering some concluding thoughts.
Overall, we find that interveners have been modestly successful in
influencing the development of Canada’s religious freedom doctrine.
We offer a number of observations to support this conclusion. First, the
SCC directly referenced intervener submissions or materials cited only
by interveners in a substantial number of the cases in our sample. Second,
the SCC directly referenced case law that was cited only by interveners in
Amselem v Syndicat Northcrest and relied on that case law to modify the
basic doctrinal framework for assessing religious freedom claims. Third,
Symbolism” 42:1 Conn L Rev 185 at 190. Cf Callaghan advances a somewhat nuanced version of
this theory, arguing that the democratic benefits of participation itself outweigh the risks to judicial
legitimacy: Geoffrey D Callaghan, “Intervenors at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ.
8.
Chan & Kislowicz, supra note 5, crediting Alarie & Green. A third theory is that interventions
allow judges to seek out arguments that support their partisan preferences: Alarie & Green, supra note
4. We leave this theory aside on the basis that it explains a phenomenon but does not provide a reason
for valuing interventions.
9.
See Chan & Kislowicz, ibid.
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in a number of section 2(a) decisions, there is inferential evidence that
interveners influenced some of the reasoning in the majority decision of
the SCC. Fourth, in a few section 2(a) decisions, a concurring minority
of the Court directly reproduced intervener submissions on collective
religious freedom. Based on this evidence, we suggest that interveners
have enjoyed some success as norm entrepreneurs in section 2(a) litigation.
While the Court has sometimes been influenced by interveners, however,
it has also occasionally developed legal principles that neither interveners
nor the principal parties to the appeal addressed in written argument.
This reminds us that, despite our legal system’s adversarial nature and
its accommodation of multiple participants, courts retain control over the
development of our constitutional narrative.
I.

Testing intervener influence at the Supreme Court of Canada

1. The relationship between quality and influence
Jurists who support intervener participation often argue that interventions
improve the quality of judicial decisions. The general idea of the quality
theory is that “by hearing from the intervener, the Court will learn
information or be exposed to arguments that it would not otherwise
be exposed to, and this will increase the probability that an optimal
disposition of the appeal will be reached.”10 The SCC rules generally
prohibit interveners from taking a position on the outcome of the appeal.11
However, there are a number of ways in which interveners might affect
the Court’s consideration of the issues before it, thus “improving the
quality” of its judgments. One possibility is that interveners draw a court’s
attention to relevant precedents that it might otherwise have overlooked.12
Another is that interveners add nuance to the dispute by “introducing subtle
variations of the basic argument,” or making emotive arguments that the
principal litigants are hesitant to embrace.13 Proponents of intervention
argue that interveners can help the court understand the potential impact
of its decision on parties not before the court.14 They can expose the
Court to views from marginalized or disadvantaged actors that would not
themselves have the capacity to initiate constitutional litigation.15
10. Alarie & Green, supra note 4 at 386.
11. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, r 42(3)
12. Bernard Dickens, “A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention” (1977) 40:6 Mod L Rev
666.
13. Samuel Krislov, “The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy” (1963) 72:4 Yale LJ
694 at 711.
14. See e.g. Philip L Bryden, “Public Interest Intervention in the Courts” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 490
at 507-508.
15. LEAF, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada” (1986) at para 4, online (pdf): <www.
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The quality theory assumes the existence of some “optimal disposition”
of an appeal. This assumption makes it difficult to evaluate the quality
theory’s strength, since whether an appeal has been optimally decided is
ultimately a normative question upon which reasonable people are likely to
disagree. For this reason, we take no position here on whether interveners
have moved the SCC closer to “optimal” dispositions of religious freedom
conflicts. Instead, we ask whether the interventions within our data set
influenced the resultant decisions at all.
We assess intervener influence by (a) identifying how Canada’s religious
freedom doctrine has developed over time, and (b) analyzing the extent to
which interveners’ arguments are reflected in those developments. Apart
from instances where a Court attributes a point to an intervener specifically
or where judgments borrow directly from intervener’s arguments, it may
not be possible to prove that an intervention “caused” a court to decide a
dispute in a certain way. However, if judicial reasons contain ideas that
are present in intervener factums (especially if those ideas are not present
in the parties’ factums), it seems reasonable to infer that the interventions
influenced the resultant judicial decision. If intervener submissions on a
particular theme are largely not reflected in the doctrine, on the other hand,
it seems reasonable to infer that those submissions did not influence the
court.
2. Methods
Our project sought to measure intervener influence in the sixteen religious
freedom cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada between 2001 and
2018.16 We included both government and non-governmental interveners
in our dataset.17 Our research team analyzed the factums submitted by
the principal parties and interveners in each case, as well as the resultant
decisions. We limited our analysis to SCC cases because SCC decisions
make the most lasting changes to legal doctrine and because factums
filed in SCC cases are easy to obtain. We limited our analysis to written
submissions because of resource constraints. Future research that analyzed
interveners’ oral arguments, press releases and public commentary could
enrich our understanding of the function and value of interventions.
We applied two principal qualitative analysis methods to the documents
in our dataset. First, we searched for general indicators of intervener
leaf.ca> [perma.cc/549A-P2YD].
16. Appendix 1 lists the cases.
17. As we noted in our earlier work, there are important differences between government interveners
and non-governmental interveners, which are particularly relevant to whether and how interveners
promote the legitimacy of judicial decisions: Chan and Kislowicz, supra note 5 at Part V.
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influence, including whether and how often interveners are specifically
mentioned in judicial decisions. We also tracked the judicial citation of
case law and scholarship referenced only by interveners, and highlighted
the citations that most clearly influenced the resultant decisions. Part 3
summarizes the results of these general inquiries. Second, we took an indepth look at intervener submissions on a common theme in our data set:
collective religious freedom. Part 4 summarizes the results of this detailed
qualitative analysis.
II. General indicators of influence
1. Direct references to interveners
In the 16 religious freedom cases heard by the SCC between 2001 and
2018, 103 unique interveners made 190 separate interventions. Interveners
took varying positions on the scope and meaning of section 2(a). Some
interveners addressed other issues, such as the interpretation of the
Charter’s equality guarantee and the appropriate standard of review.
In six of the 16 SCC cases in our dataset, the Court made direct
reference to interventions.18 The Court referred to 10 of 56 interventions in
the course of those six cases. This rate of direct references to interventions
supports the view that interveners are more than occasionally influencing
the SCC.
Multani, Bruker, and TWU 2018 provide examples of directly traceable
intervener influence. The issue in Multani was whether a school board
that prohibited a Sikh child from wearing a kirpan to school unjustifiably
violated the child’s religious freedom. The intervener Canadian Human
Rights Commission submitted that the relevant schools observed a standard
of “reasonable” (rather than “complete” or “perfect”) safety.19 The SCC
accepted this submission, which supported its conclusion that prohibiting
the kirpan without evidence of dangerousness was inconsistent with the
school board’s own policies. In Bruker, a dispute about a Jewish divorce,
the SCC endorsed the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s
articulation of a legal principle allowing the adjudication of civil disputes
that involve religious obligations.20 Finally, in TWU 2018, the majority

18. Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31 at paras 15,
69, 86 [TWU v BCCT]; Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6 at para 46
[Multani]; Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54 at para 43; AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family
Services), 2009 SCC 30 at paras 119, 228-229, 236 [AC]; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission)
v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at paras 88, 93, 105 [Whatcott]; Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity
Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at paras 96, 251 [LSBC v TWU].
19. Multani, ibid at para 46.
20. Bruker v Marcovitz, supra note 18 at para 43.
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attributed to interveners Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, Start Proud,
and OUTlaws the finding that attending TWU’s law school would require
LGBTQ students “to deny a crucial component of their identity in the most
private and personal of spaces for three years in order to receive a legal
education.”21 This finding supported the conclusion that the law society’s
decision not to accredit TWU was reasonable.
2. Intervener citations to case law and international law
Materials cited only by interveners accounted for about 13.5% of all
judicial citations of primary law materials in the cases in our dataset. The
Court made 703 citations to cases and international legal documents; 95 of
these citations referred to cases and documents that appeared in intervener
factums only. 71 of the 95 citations appeared in majority judgments.22 We
find intervener influence here, in the sense that the SCC engaged with or
relied upon resources that likely would not have been part of the court
record in the absence of interventions. However, the “success” of the
interventions appears more variable.
The influence of intervener-only cited case law is most clearly
discernible in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, the current leading case on
freedom of conscience and religion in Canada. In Amselem, a majority
of the SCC held that, in adjudicating alleged violations of section 2(a),
a court should focus on the sincerity of the claimant’s belief rather than
the belief’s consistency with religious doctrine. The SCC quoted from
two US Supreme Court cases in justifying this focus,23 cases that had
been put before the Court only by the intervening Ontario Human Rights
Commission.24 The Amselem majority also held that religious freedom
encompasses both mandatory and voluntary “expressions of faith.”25 In
doing so, it quoted from R v Laws,26 a decision cited only in the joint
intervention of the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada and the SeventhDay Adventist Church in Canada.27 Both of these holdings have become
important tenets of the section 2(a) jurisprudence.
Intervener-cited legal materials impacted the disposition of several
other cases within our dataset. In TWU v BCCT, for example, the majority
21. LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 at para 96.
22. Table of citations to intervener-only materials on file with authors.
23. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para 45 [Amselem]. The two cases were Thomas
v Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division 450 US 707 (1981) and Frazee v Illinois
Department of Employment Security 489 US 829 (1989).
24. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Ontario Human Rights Commission at para 23).
25. Ibid at para 47.
26. (1998), 165 DLR (4th) 301, 41 OR (3d) 499.
27. Ameslem, supra note 23 (Factum of the Intervener, EFC and Seventh-Day Adventist Church in
Canada at para 17).
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held that because BC’s human rights legislation exempted a religious
school from discrimination claims on associational grounds, there was a
corollary duty to treat the school’s graduates as worthy of participating
in public activities.28 In support of this reasoning, the majority quoted
from Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd,29 a case
that only the intervener Evangelical Fellowship of Canada had cited
for the same point.30 In Bruker, the Court cited one Canadian and two
Australian cases that had been put to it only by the intervener Canadian
Civil Liberties Association.31 The Canadian case was used to justify the
Court’s enforcement of an agreement with religious and civil aspects,32
while the Australian cases were used to justify the Court’s use of civil
remedies to encourage a spouse to provide a religious divorce.33 Similarly,
in Whatcott, the SCC quoted from two decisions of the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal to add substance to its understanding of hate speech.34 The
intervener LEAF had cited both cases in its written submissions,35 and the
intervener Canadian Human Rights Tribunal had cited one.36
Interveners have also promoted their preferred interpretations of
religious freedom by putting international legal documents before the
Court. This strategy met with some success in Loyola High School v
Quebec (AG).37 In offering its most thorough account of collective religious
freedom to date, the majority of the SCC stated that “an essential ingredient
of the vitality of a religious community is the ability of its members to pass
on their beliefs to their children, whether through instruction in the home
or participation in communal institutions.”38 In support of this conclusion,
the court cited Article 18(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and

28. TWU v BCCT, supra note 18 at para 35.
29. Ibid citing Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 554,
23 DLR (4th) 321.
30. TWU v BCCT, supra note 18 (Factum of the Intervener, EFC at para 15).
31. Bruker v Marcovitz, supra note 18 (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at paras 26, 36-38). The
SCC also referred to a case cited only by interveners in Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay
(City), 2015 SCC 16 at para 124 [Saguenay].
32. Bruker v Marcovitz, supra note 18 at para 45 citing Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v
Hofer, [1992] 3 SCR 165, 97 DLR (4th) 17.
33. Bruker v Marcovitz, supra note 18 at para 87. The Court cited In the Marriage of Shulsinger
(1977), 13 ALR 53; In the Marriage of Steinmetz (1980), 6 FLR 554.
34. Whatcott, supra note 18 at para 44 citing Warman v Kouba, 2006 CHRT 50 and Warman v
Tremaine (No 2), 2007 CHRT 2, 59 CHRR D/391.
35. Whatcott, supra note 18 (Factum of the Intervener, LEAF at para 19).
36. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CHRC at para 26).
37. See also AC, supra note 18 at para 93, where the SCC cited the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in a way suggested by the intervening AG Alberta.
38. Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at para 64 [Loyola].
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Political Rights,39 a provision that several interveners (but none of the
principal parties) had cited for the same principle. 40
Our analysis of intervener-cited legal materials suggests that norm
entrepreneurship can sometimes produce ambiguous or unintended results
for interveners.41 This was clearly demonstrated in TWU v BCCT.42 In that
case, the Secondary School Teachers’ Federation relied on P(D) v S(C)43
to argue (1) that equality values are interpretive aids for the Charter,44 and
(2) that the “best interests of the child” principle supported the College of
Teachers’ refusal to accredit a free-standing teacher education program at
the private university.45 A majority of the SCC relied on the case but for two
quite different propositions: (1) that “[n]either freedom of religion nor the
guarantee against discrimination based on sexual orientation is absolute,”
and (2) that the College’s decision should be quashed since there was no
evidence of discrimination that affected children’s best interests.46
3. Intervener citations to academic texts
Academic texts cited only by interveners comprised about 7.5% of all
academic texts cited by the SCC in the cases in our dataset. The SCC cited
intervener-cited academic texts, including 16 texts not cited by a principal
party, in 10 of 16 religious freedom cases.47 As in the case of primary legal
materials, we may infer intervener influence from this evidence. However,
we found no case in which the SCC directly reproduced language from an
academic text in articulating a doctrinal test.
Indeed, in most cases within our dataset, intervener-cited scholarship
had no discernible impact on majority decisions. Majority judgments
occasionally referred to intervener-cited scholarship, either to approve

39. 999 UNTS 171.
40. Loyola, supra note 38, (Factum of the Intervener, Christian Legal Fellowship [CLF] at para 34;
Factum of the Intervener, WSO at para 10; Factum of the Intervener, Home School Legal Defence
Association at para 32).
41. For a similar conclusion in the equality rights context, see Jennifer Koshan “International Law as
a Strategic Tool for Equality Rights Litigation: A Cautionary Tale” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike &
Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 443 at 444-445.
42. TWU v BCCT, supra note 18. See also AC, supra note 18, where several interveners cited the
SCC’s decision in Young v Young, [1993] 8 WWR 513, 108 DLR (4th) 193, for varying purposes, and
the SCC interpreted it in quite a different fashion.
43. [1993] 4 SCR 141, 108 DLR (4th) 287.
44. TWU v BCCT, supra note 18 (Factum of the Intervener, Secondary School Teachers’ Federation
at para 40).
45. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Secondary School Teachers’ Federation at para 80).
46. Ibid at paras 29-32, 62.
47. Table of citations to intervener-only materials on file with authors.
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it48 or refute it.49 More often, however, it was the dissenting or minority
judgments that engaged with intervener-cited scholarship.50 Some of these
engagements were relatively insignificant, in the sense that they served
only to confirm general and uncontroversial principles of constitutional
law.51 Some were more substantial. For example, in her dissenting opinion
in TWU 2001, L’Heureux-Dubé J cited and quoted from six texts noted in
the factums of the interveners Egale and The Ontario Secondary Schools
Teachers Federation, mostly to emphasize the dangers of homophobia.52
Intervener-cited scholarship appears to have influenced the thinking
of a majority of the SCC on at least one topic: state religious neutrality.
In outlining the state’s duty of religious neutrality in Lafontaine, Justice
LeBel quoted from an article by José Woehrling that the Evangelical
Fellowship of Canada and the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada
had cited in their joint factum.53 Though LeBel J was in dissent, both his
opinion and the Woehrling article were later relied upon by the majority
of the court in Saguenay.54 Work by Richard Moon, which was cited by
interveners the Canadian Secular Alliance in Saguenay and the Trustees
Coalition in des Chênes, was relied upon by the majorities in those two
cases to support the developing doctrine of state religious neutrality.55
In Saguenay, the influence of the Moon article is quite clear. The Court
relies on Moon’s assertion that the state’s treatment of individual religious
practices implicates individual identity to distinguish religious neutrality
from viewpoint neutrality, and to justify a constitutional duty of religious
neutrality on the state.56 On this topic, then, interveners appear to have

48. See e.g. Whatcott, supra note 18 at para 72 where the SCC cites the Cohen Committee Report
for the same purpose as does the intervening NWT and Yukon Human Rights Commission.
49. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 75-76 [Hutterian
Brethren].
50. See e.g. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests Lands and Natural Resource Operations),
2017 SCC 54 at para 127 [Ktunaxa]; AC, supra note 18 at para 229; Hutterian Brethren, supra note 49
at paras 186, 191.
51. See e.g. LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 (where Rowe J cited passages from the textbook of leading
constitutional law scholar Peter Hogg that had been cited by several interveners at paras 183-184,
191).
52. TWU v BCCT, supra note 18 at paras 71, 79, 81-82, 85-86, 90-91.
53. Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), 2004
SCC 48 at para 76. The source is José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et
l’adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43:2 McGill LJ 325.
54. Saguenay, supra note 31 at paras 69, 71.
55. Ibid at para 73; SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7 at para 30 [des Chênes].
56. Saguenay, supra note 31 at para 73, quoting Richard Moon, “Freedom of Religion Under the
Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality” (2012) 45 UBC L Rev 497 at 507 (emphasis added
by Gascon J).
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succeeded in influencing religious freedom doctrine by putting academic
scholarship before the Court.
We observed that, as with intervener-cited case law, interveners’
invocation of scholarship sometimes produced unintended results.
In Loyola, the intervening Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada
and Seventh-Day Adventist Church-Quebec Conference relied on the
scholarship of Benjamin Berger to support their argument that the
Minister of Education had “disparaged” a religious tradition by refusing
to exempt a Jesuit high school from teaching the Ethics and Religious
Culture curriculum in the ordinary way.57 The majority of the SCC relied
on this scholarship in holding that the state “has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that students in all schools are capable, as adults, of conducting
themselves with openness and respect as they confront cultural and
religious differences.”58 This led to the conclusion that the Minister
could legitimately require religious schools to teach about other religious
traditions,59 a result that seems at odds with the interveners’ argument.
This highlights that even where interveners succeed in drawing a court’s
attention to relevant precedents and scholarship, they may fail to achieve
their strategic, norm-entrepreneurial goals.
III. Intervener influence on collective religious freedom doctrine
Assessing the extent to which interveners have influenced our constitutional
jurisprudence is a complex task that requires a variety of research methods.
Beyond identifying and tracking general indicators of intervener influence,
we compared the arguments of interveners and parties with jurisprudential
developments, seeking to identify noticeable similarities from which
we might infer intervener influence. There are limitations to this type
of qualitative analysis. It is often impossible, as we noted in Part 1, to
prove that an intervention caused a court to decide a dispute in a certain
way. In addition, significant time and resources are required to code legal
arguments. We analyzed a limited number of religious freedom cases in
this project and coded only one of several reoccurring themes in our data
set, leaving open questions about whether interveners were more or less
influential in other thematic areas. Despite these limitations, qualitative
analysis provides a rich set of insights that cannot be accessed other than
by systematic investigation.
57. Loyola, supra note 38 (Factum of the Intervener, Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada and
Seventh-Day Adventist Church – Quebec Conference at para 22).
58. Loyola, supra note 38 at para 48. See also Benjamin L Berger, “Religious Diversity, Education,
and the Crisis in State Neutrality” (2014) 29 CJLS 103 at 115.
59. Loyola, supra note 38 at para 48.
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In this section, we summarize our qualitative analysis of how
intervener submissions have influenced the SCC’s collective religious
freedom jurisprudence. We identified a large number of arguments on this
theme, coding over 500 references to collective religious freedom across
72 of the 204 factums in our data set.60 We begin by outlining the case law
addressing collective religious freedom, highlighting substantive doctrinal
changes and areas of ambiguity or disagreement. We then compare the
case law with the intervener submissions in our data set. We conclude that
the dominant narrative is one of modest intervener influence, comprised
primarily of instances where distinct and non-distinct (or “echo”)
intervener arguments find themselves reflected in passages from minority
and concurring judgments. However, there are a number of counternarratives that render the picture more complex.
1. Collective religious freedom in the SCC
The issue of collective religious freedom arose early in the SCC’s section
2(a) jurisprudence.61 However, questions regarding collective religious
freedom’s nature and practical consequences have received only sporadic
attention in Canada, and many remain unanswered. In our review of the
SCC cases in our dataset, we identified six sub-themes or questions related
to collective religious freedom.
•
•
•
•
•
•

First, does religious freedom have collective dimensions?
Second, at what stage of the section 2(a) analysis should the collective
dimensions of religious freedom be addressed?
Third, can institutions be the bearers of religious freedom?
Fourth, is collective religious freedom a freedom possessed by a group
qua group, or by the aggregate of its individual members?
Fifth, what is the relationship between religious freedom and freedom
of association?
Sixth, do religious groups have a claim to autonomy from the state in
cases where the Charter does not apply directly?

Here, we briefly outline whether and how the SCC has addressed each
sub-theme.

60. These numbers include references in party factums. Some other themes occurred across more
factums, but we found fewer references to these overall and none of these were specific to the doctrine
of religious freedom. They related to: balancing rights, equality-based arguments, the relation to
other constitutional provisions, and references to international law. We address the international law
references within our discussion of case law citations in Part 3.2.
61. R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713 at para 145, 35 DLR (4th) 1.
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a. Does religious freedom have collective dimensions?
The SCC has consistently held that religious freedom has collective
dimensions.62 However, the definition of religion adopted by the majority
in Amselem (2004) has been seen to privilege the individual aspects of
religious freedom.63 In contrast, Bastarache J’s dissenting judgment
emphasized that “although private beliefs have a purely personal aspect,
the other dimension of the right has genuine social significance and
involves a relationship with others.”64 Although the majority’s test for
establishing a religious freedom infringement continues to dominate the
2(a) analysis, Bastarache J’s point about the collective nature of religious
practice has also proved influential.65
The SCC’s most thorough discussion of religious freedom’s collective
dimensions to date is in Loyola (2015). The case involved a Catholic school
that objected to teaching a mandatory curriculum on ethics and religious
culture in the way the provincial government envisaged. In finding for
the school, the majority held that the Charter’s protection of religious
freedom “must…account for the socially embedded nature of religious
belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation
through communal institutions and traditions.”66 A concurring minority
also highlighted the importance of religious freedom’s collective aspects,
stating:
The individual and collective aspects of freedom of religion are
indissolubly intertwined. The freedom of religion of individuals cannot
flourish without freedom of religion for the organizations through which
those individuals express their religious practices and through which
they transmit their faith.67

b. At what stage of the section 2(a) analysis should the collective
dimensions of religious freedom be addressed?
The SCC divided on this issue in Hutterian Brethren (2009).68 The
majority held that the impugned law’s impact on a religious community

62. Ibid.
63. Amselem, supra note 23 at para 39. See Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference
and the Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at ch 2; Howard
Kislowicz, “Religious Freedom and Canada’s Commitments to Multiculturalism” (2012) 31:1 NJCL
1; Victor M Muñiz-Fraticelli and Lawrence David Lawrence, “Religious Institutionalism in a Canadian
Context” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 1049.
64. Amselem, supra note 23 at para 137 (Bastarache J, dissenting).
65. Loyola, supra note 38 at para 92 (McLachlin CJ & Moldaver J).
66. Ibid at para 60.
67. Ibid at para 94 (McLachlin CJ & Moldaver J).
68. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 49.
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was relevant only in assessing the law’s proportionality, while a dissenting
minority held that the communal impact was relevant at the infringement
stage. This division was arguably prompted by disagreement over the
proper characterization of the Hutterite Colony’s claim and has not reemerged in the same way since. The majority understood the protected
religious practice to be the prohibition of any individual Colony
member being photographed, and held that the “the broader impact of
the photo requirement on the Wilson Colony community is relevant at
the proportionality stage of the section 1 analysis.”69 However, had the
majority understood the protected religious practice to be the Wilson
Colony’s collective lifestyle (as Abella J asserted in dissent),70 then the
majority may have addressed the collective aspects of the claim in the
infringement stage of the Charter analysis. We discuss Hutterian Brethren
in section 4.b.
c. Can institutions be the bearers of religious freedom?
The case law has been persistently ambiguous about whether institutions
enjoy religious freedom. In Edwards Books (1986), Dickson CJ raised
the issue of “whether a corporate entity ought to be deemed in certain
circumstances to possess the religious values of specified natural persons”,
but declined to address it.71 In Loyola (2015) and TWU (2018), a majority
of the SCC again declined to address the question of institutional or
corporate religious freedom.72 The concurring minority in Loyola, on
the other hand, was ready to recognize the religious freedom of certain
institutions. It held that an institution meets the requirements for section
2(a) protection “if (1) it is constituted primarily for religious purposes and
(2) its operation accords with these religious purposes.”73
d. Is collective religious freedom a freedom possessed by a group qua
group?
Collective religious freedom claims also raise difficult questions about
whether collective religious freedom should be understood as a freedom
possessed by a group qua group, or by the aggregate of its individual
members. The SCC has not answered this question definitively. However,
one justice spoke to the issue in TWU (2018), asserting that collective
religious freedom is best understood as an aggregate of individual rights.
In Rowe J’s view, institutions do not possess religious freedom, but if they
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Ibid at para 31.
Ibid at para 130.
R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, supra note 61 at para 153.
Loyola, supra note 38 at para 34; LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 at para 61 (majority).
Loyola, supra note 38 at para 100 (McLachlin CJ & Moldaver J).
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do, their freedoms do not extend further than the individual freedoms of
community members.74
e. What is the relationship between religious freedom and freedom of
association?
The SCC divided on this question in TWU (2018), with the majority
largely subsuming the claimants’ associational freedom into their religious
freedom claim, and several judges relying on freedom of association to
demonstrate a deeper Charter violation. The majority judgment alluded
to the often-mentioned links between collective religious freedom and
freedom of association,75 but ultimately held that, regardless of whether
the decision was characterized as a violation of religious or associational
freedom, the decisions of the law societies were justified. Chief Justice
McLachlin’s concurring opinion parted ways with the majority on this
point. In her view, the majority’s treatment of expressive and associative
freedom was underdeveloped. “TWU’s insistence on its Community
Covenant Agreement expresses its believers’ religious commitment and
their desire to associate with people who commit to practices that accord
with their religious beliefs.”76 McLachlin CJ relied directly on this holding
in asserting that the infringement of TWU community’s rights was not
minor, as the majority had held.77 Justices Brown and Côté offered a
similar analysis in dissent.78
f.

Does religious freedom protect religious institutional autonomy in
cases where the Charter is not directly applicable?  
The SCC has recently held on two occasions that decisions of religious
voluntary associations are not subject to judicial review unless there is an
underlying legal right in issue,79 but it is unclear to what extent religious
institutional autonomy is protected by religious freedom.
2. Intervener submissions on collective religious freedom
Interveners in Canadian religious freedom litigation have sought to be
norm entrepreneurs on the issue of collective religious freedom, making
arguments across the six sub-themes identified. In Table 1, we detail the
number of interveners who made arguments on each sub-theme in those
74. LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 at paras 217-220 (Rowe J).
75. Ibid at paras 76, 78 (Majority).
76. Ibid at para 122 (McLachlin CJ, emphasis in original).
77. Ibid at para 134 (McLachlin CJ).
78. Ibid at para 319 (dissent).
79. Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26
[Wall]; Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga, 2021 SCC 22.
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cases where the issue of collective religious freedom arose. An extended
version of this table, which includes pinpoint references to the arguments,
is included as Appendix 1.
2
3
1
8
6
24
Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University,
2018 SCC 32
Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada,
2018 SCC 33

0

10
6
1
2
6
12
Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial
Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26

0

0

0
2

0
0

0
0

2
2
5

0
1
7

18
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and
Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54

7
16
Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC
12

Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16

0
4
1
10

0
26
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013
SCC 11

0

0

0
0
0
0

0

1
8
SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7

0

1
0
0

0

2
8

0

0
1
1

1

Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37

0

0

1
0

0
0

3

0
1
Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54

0

2
30
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79

0

0
1
0
3
3
3
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-JérômeLafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48

0

0
0
0
3
2
8
Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of
Teachers, 2001 SCC 31

0

ST1
Case

# of
Interveners

ST2

ST3

ST4

ST5

ST6

Table 1: Intervener Collective Religious Freedom Arguments by Sub-Theme

ST1: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Collective Aspects sub-theme
ST2: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Infringement/Proportionality sub-theme
ST3: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Institutional Religious Freedom sub-theme
ST4: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Aggregate vs Group Right sub-theme
ST5: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Freedom of Association sub-theme
ST6: # Interveners Makings arguments re: Church Autonomy sub-theme
Grey shading = Principal party/ies also made argument on sub-theme

3. Intervener influence on collective religious freedom doctrine: the
dominant narrative
The dominant narrative that emerges from our analysis of party
submissions, intervener submissions, and judicial reasons on collective
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religious freedom is one of modest intervener influence. In no case did
an intervener’s written submission on collective religious freedom have a
clear effect on the legal tests adopted by the majority of the SCC. However,
certain ideas that interveners put forward for the Court’s consideration can
be identified in passages in the correlating decisions.
Our analysis distinguishes “distinct” intervener arguments from
“echo” (or non-distinct) intervener arguments, since only the former
category of arguments are permitted by the rules governing intervention.80
Consistently with the SCC rules governing intervention, we define distinct
arguments as arguments that are (entirely or substantially) “different from
those of the other [principal] parties.”81 We define “echo” arguments as
arguments that are not substantially different from those of the principal
parties, but rather repeat, amplify or offer subtle variations of those
arguments. Adopting this terminology, we identify three patterns that
together constitute the dominant narrative of modest intervener influence.
First, in a few cases within our dataset, interveners made distinct arguments
that appear to have influenced the resultant decisions. Second, in a number
of cases, interveners made echo arguments that appear to have contributed
to elements of the Court’s reasoning. Third, in a few cases, interveners
made distinct arguments that the SCC did not address.
a. Distinct arguments with modest influence
In some of the cases within our sample, interveners made arguments,
different from those of the parties, that appear to have modestly influenced
the resultant judicial decision. The 2004 Same-Sex Marriage Reference
provides a first example. While the Attorney General who initiated
the reference made no specific submissions on institutional religious
freedom,82 several interveners did. The Seventh Day Adventist Church
submitted that the Charter required “a respectful distance from state
interference in the religious institutions of our faith communities,”83
and identified the rental of church buildings for wedding ceremonies as
one way that the new definition of marriage would “conflict with the
Church.”84 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints submitted
80. We discuss those rules in our first paper: Chan & Kislowicz, supra note 5 at 225-226.
81. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, r 57(2)(b).
82. Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 (Factum of The Attorney General of Canada:
the AG focused its submissions on the rights of religious officials, not religious institutions. The closest
the factum comes to addressing collective religious freedom is a sub-heading that reads: “Religious
freedom does not entitle one group to demand state endorsement of its beliefs to the exclusion of
others” at 16) [Same-Sex Marriage Reference].
83. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada at para 3).
84. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada at para 8).

Divine Intervention, Part II: Narratives of Norm Entrepreneurship
in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation

19

that section 2(a) must be interpreted to protect the Church’s right to deny
access to Temples and other facilities for the solemnization of same-sex
marriages. It also referred extensively to First Amendment case law on the
protection of religious institutional autonomy, arguing for the extension
of US constitutional law’s “Church Autonomy” principles to Canadian
religious organizations.85
It is plausible to conjecture that these intervener arguments on the
protection of religious institutional autonomy influenced the unanimous
opinion of the Court. The SCC’s discussion of religious freedom focused
primarily on the rights of religious officials not to be compelled to perform
marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. The SCC did briefly opine,
however, that just as compelling religious officials to perform marriage
would “almost certainly run afoul” of section 2(a),86 so would compelling
the use of “sacred places for the celebration of such marriages.”87 This
statement closely tracks the intervener submissions on the control of church
property as a function of institutional autonomy. However, the opinion
does not specify how the compelled use of sacred places would infringe
religious freedom, leaving it unclear whether the court is concerned with
the protection of individual religious autonomy, institutional religious
autonomy, or both.88
Ktunaxa offers a second example of distinct intervener arguments
modestly influencing a judicial opinion. The case involved a decision
by the Government of British Columbia to approve the construction of
a ski resort on Qat’muk, one of the Ktunaxa people’s most sacred sites.
The Ktunaxa believed that the proposed resort would drive Grizzly Bear
Spirit from the territory, depriving them of access to an important spiritual
presence,89 and rendering their spiritual practices futile.90 The individual
and institutional appellants that represented the Ktunaxa people91 argued
that the Ministerial approval breached both their freedom of religion
and section 35 Aboriginal rights. The party submissions identified “the
Ktunaxa” as the subject(s) of the alleged infringement of section 2(a),
but did not directly address the implications or nature of their collective
religious freedom claim.92
85. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints at para 53).
86. Ibid at para 56.
87. Ibid at para 59.
88. In any event, this holding has arguably been overtaken by Ktunaxa, supra note 49, though the
passage is not cited in that case.
89. Ibid at para 59.
90. Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 67); Ibid at para 59.
91. Ibid at para 2.
92. The appellants did include affidavit evidence that emphasized the links between the protection
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A diverse group of governments and associations intervened in
Ktunaxa, exposing the Court to a range of arguments about the value
of religious communities93 and the scope of the Charter’s protection of
communal religious practice.94 While many of these echoed or elaborated
the submissions of the principal parties, interveners made at least one
distinct argument that is reflected in Moldaver and Côté JJ’s concurring
minority judgment. Three interveners, the Alberta Muslim Public Affairs
Council, the Shibogama First Nations Council and the BCCLA, all
emphasized the importance of ensuring that the protections of section 2(a)
extend equally to non-Western religious traditions. The Alberta Muslim
Public Affairs Council submitted that an overly individualistic approach
to religious freedom would privilege Western approaches to religion over
others,95 and “[denigrate] religious traditions that emphasize communal
worship or other communal religious activities.”96 The Shibogama First
Nations Council and the BCCLA emphasized the importance of equality
with respect to the enjoyment of freedom of religion, and cited secondary
literature on the unique role of sacred sites within traditional Indigenous
spiritualities.97 The minority judgment indicated an attentiveness to this
literature, and a conscientiousness of understanding religious commitments
in their own terms.98
b. “Echo arguments” with modest influence
While interveners occasionally make distinct arguments, our analysis
of the collective religious freedom doctrine suggests that interveners
more often offer “subtle variations” or more emotive versions of party
arguments.99 Such “echo arguments” are arguably inconsistent with the
established purpose of intervention, which is to provide the court with
of Qat’muk and the collective cultural security of Ktunaxa citizens: Ktunaxa, supra note 50 (Factum
of the Appellant at para 27).
93. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Evangelical Fellowship of Canada [EFC] at para 7); Ibid (Factum
of the Intervener, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council at para 18-19).
94. See for example, Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council at para
1, 43); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC at para 10).
95. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council at para 9).
96. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council at para 16). The Council
illustrated its point with examples of communal practices from the intervener group’s faith tradition,
such as the Muslim practice of “Jumu’ah”, a congregational prayer that is performed every Friday
afternoon: para 22.
97. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Shibogama First Nations Council at paras 24); Ibid (Factum of
the Intervener, BCCLA at paras 7-13).
98. Ibid at para 127 (“The connection to the physical world, specifically to land, is a central feature of
Indigenous religions… Unlike in Judeo-Christian faiths, for example, where the divine is considered
to be supernatural, the spiritual realm in the Indigenous context is inextricably linked to the physical
world…”).
99. Samuel Krislov, supra note 12.
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submissions different from those of the other parties to the appeal.100
Because echo arguments are at least partially duplicative, it is difficult
to measure the contribution that they make to judicial norm-generation.
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases where echo arguments appear
to have contributed to the SCC’s pronouncements on collective religious
freedom. We discuss two of these cases here: Loyola High School v Quebec
(AG), and Wall v Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses.
In Loyola (2015), a Jesuit boys’ high school challenged the
constitutionality of a Ministerial decision that the school was required
to teach Quebec’s mandatory Ethics and Religion Culture curriculum in
a non-sectarian way. The parties addressed collective religious freedom
briefly in their factums, focusing largely on whether Loyola, as a religious
corporation and a religious school, could possess religious freedom
rights.101 The Attorney General of Quebec argued that Loyola was not a
rights-holder under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter or its analog
in Quebec. In its submission, a moral person lacked the cognitive and
emotional resources to hold a sincere belief, and therefore could not benefit
directly from the protection of section 2(a).102 Loyola and the parents of
one of its students, disputed the Attorney General’s view.103 However,
their factum did not address the ontological objections the Attorney
General had raised to the corporation’s status as a rights-holder. Rather, in
asserting Loyola’s right to claim religious freedom as a corporate entity,
the appellants submitted that Canadian law had protected the corporate
dimensions of religious practice for some 250 years,104 and that it had done
so “not to protect idiosyncratic religious claims, but rather to address the
concerns of religious Canadians as members of their religious groups and
communities.”105
There were 16 interveners in Loyola, most of them Christian
organizations supporting Loyola’s section 2(a) claim. Many of these
interveners amplified and elaborated the appellants’ submissions on
the nature and importance of collective religious freedom. Interveners
emphasized the importance of religious freedom’s collective and
associational aspects,106 characterizing the freedom to manifest one’s
100. See Rules of the SCC, SOR/2002-156, r 57(2)(b); R v Morgentaler, [1993] 1 SCR 462 at para 9,
1993 CarswellNS 429.
101. Loyola High School c Quebec (Ministre de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport), 2010 QCCS 2631
at para 213-261.
102. Loyola, supra note 38 (Factum of the Respondent at para 61).
103. Ibid (Factum of the Appellants at para 43).
104. Ibid (Factum of the Appellants at para 58).
105. Ibid (Factum of the Appellants at para 53).
106. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at paras 8, 13, 16).
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religion in community with others as a freedom “at the ‘heart’” of section
2(a).107 They also identified reasons why collective religious rights deserved
“robust protection.”108 The Canadian Council for Christian Charities
(CCCC) submitted that religious freedom is “the primary condition” for
community life,109 and characterized religious communities as “societal
structures” within which “we share common perspectives of life’s purpose
and meaning.”110 Other interveners argued that the protection of religious
communities furthers diversity, pluralism, and multiculturalism.111 Still
others cited their own religious principles to illustrate the importance of
faith’s collective dimension. For example, the World Sikh Organization
submitted that both individual and collective religious activity are
“indispensable and crucial elements of Sikh practice,”112 while a coalition
of Catholic and Orthodox Christian charities (the “Catholic Civil Rights
League Coalition”) referred to the Christian belief that “‘where two or
three are gathered’ Jesus Christ is with them.”113
The Loyola interveners also expanded the party submissions on whether
institutions themselves enjoy religious freedom. Most of the interveners
argued in favour of corporate or institutional religious freedom. The EFC
urged the SCC to “clarify the place of religion, religious individuals,
communities and corporations within Canada’s free and democratic
society,” and argued that Loyola as a corporation held religious freedom
rights.114 The CCCC submitted that the protection of the religious rights
of institutions has been part of “our political and philosophical tradition”
since “the early beginnings of our modern age,” linking the protection of
corporate religious freedom back to the 11th century Papal revolution and
its doctrine of the “freedom of the Church.”115 The Catholic Civil Rights
League Coalition argued that “[i]f religious communities manifest their
religious belief through a corporation that has, as its purpose, the exercise

107. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Catholic Civil Rights League [CCRL] at para 13). At para 96,
the minority cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right to manifest religion
“either alone or in community with others” (emphasis by the minority).
108. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Canadian Council for Christian Charities [CCCC] at paras 7, 29).
109. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 12).
110. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 29).
111. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Association of Christian Educators and Schools Canada at para
37); Ibid, (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at paras 14, 17).
112. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, WSO at para 19; see also para 24: “In an important sense…it is
impossible to be a Sikh by oneself—one can only be a Sikh by acting with other Sikhs in the collective
of the Khalsa and Panth.”)
113. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at para 18).
114. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC at para 2, 12). See also Ibid (Factum of the Intervener,
CCRL at para 3); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at para 22).
115. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 5, 9).
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of religion, then that corporation also enjoys freedom of religion.”116 A
number of interveners referred to comparative and international legal
sources to support the existence of corporate religious freedom.117
The interveners also went further than the parties in offering reasons
for the protection of institutional religious freedom. The CCLA and the
Association of Christian Educators and Schools Canada both characterized
religious institutions as manifestations of religious communities, with
the latter association arguing that “[t]here is no meaningful difference
between the religious freedom of the individuals that establish and operate
a confessional school (e.g. the teachers, parents, and students) and that
of the school itself.” 118 Several interveners focused on the function of
religious institutions, arguing that they existed “to complement and
facilitate the exercise and manifestation of a particular religious culture,
practice and identity.”119 Still others focused on the logistical necessity of
religious corporations, arguing that it was “practically impossible” for a
religious group of individuals to manifest their legal beliefs without the
legal personality that allowed them to “enter into contracts, own land or
operate a bank account.”120
The extensive intervener submissions on the nature and importance
of collective religious freedom appear to be reflected in the majority
judgment of Abella J. The majority described collective practices and
beliefs as “a crucial part of Loyola’s claim,”121 a move that distinguished
the judgment from previous decisions where the Court had addressed
collective religious claims through individual religious freedoms.122 The
majority declined to decide whether corporations enjoy religious freedom.
However, it recognized the logistical necessity of incorporation, writing
that “individuals may sometimes require a legal entity” to give effect
116. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at para 33). See also Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC
at para 4).
117. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 19); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, WSO at paras
11-13); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at para 27).
118. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at para 28); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Association
of Christian Educators and Schools Canada at paras 19, 20; see also para 32 “any intrusion on
confessional teaching is an intrusion on the rights of each parent and their organization, the school.”)
119. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC at para 21). See also Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL
at para 4); (Factum of the Intervener, Corporation Archiepiscopale Catholique Romaine de Montréal
et al at para 16-18 religious corporations are “themselves created by law simply to manifest and ensure
the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion, through their association.”).
120. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at para 21). See also Ibid (Factum of the Intervener,
WSO “schools and other institutions are almost exclusively registered corporate legal persons like
the Appellant Loyola in this case” at para 23). See also Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Corporation
Archiepiscopale Catholique Romaine de Montréal et al at paras 16-18).
121. Ibid at para 61.
122. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 49 at para 31.
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to the communal aspects of their religious beliefs and practice.123 The
majority also acknowledged that its interpretation of section 2(a) must
“account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, and the
deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through communal
institutions and traditions.”124 While this specific wording is not traceable
to a particular intervener submission, it seems likely that the emotive
intervener arguments contributed to the majority’s recognition of the
important collective aspects of religious freedom claims.
Wall provides a different, thought-provoking context within which
to consider the effect of intervener echo arguments on judicial decisions.
The SCC was asked to decide whether a superior court had jurisdiction
to review a religious association’s decision to remove one of its members
from fellowship. The Court held unanimously that it did not. While the
reasons for judgment focus on limiting the scope of public law remedies to
exercises of state authority,125 one may speculate that the forceful religious
freedom arguments made by both the appellants and the interveners
contributed to the strong decision in favour of the Congregation.
The appellants in Wall, the Highwood Congregation and its Judicial
Committee of Elders, cast the issue of the reviewability of the Committee’s
decision primarily as an issue of religious freedom. Their factum identified
four “fundamental constitutional principles” that militated against
review.126 One of these principles was that religious freedom protects
the autonomy of religious communities. The appellants cited Canadian
and European case law establishing that religious freedom guarantees
communities the freedom to associate freely and to organize their
churches and communities.127 They argued that the constitutional freedom
to organize must protect their autonomy with regard to membership
and the enforcement of religious norms.128 They argued that public law
concepts of fairness should not apply to private organizations based on
mutual religious belief,129 and that protecting the Congregation’s right to
exist as an autonomous religious community would benefit not only the
Congregation, but society at large.130
There were ten interveners in Wall, all of whom directly or indirectly
supported the Highwood Congregation’s position that the Committee’s
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Loyola, supra note 38 at para 33.
Ibid at para 60.
See, in particular, Wall, supra note 79 at paras 14-17.
Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 39)
Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 63) (citing Lafontaine).
Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 64).
Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 99).
Ibid (Factum of the Appellant at para 67).
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decision to expel Mr. Wall was not subject to judicial review. Many of
these interveners reiterated, elaborated and offered subtle variations of the
appellants’ arguments on the protected autonomy of religious groups. For
example, the Christian Legal Fellowship and the CCCC both reiterated
the appellants’ submission on the importance of membership decisions
to religious group autonomy, citing a common text that describes selfregulation of membership as a “group’s foremost freedom.”131 The
Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada submitted that the common
law and section 2(a) provided independent bases for a court to refrain
from adjudicating church membership,132 while the EFC and the Catholic
Civil Rights League submitted that religious freedom permits religious
communities to self-define.133 The Association for Reformed Political
Action Canada went one step further, arguing that the Preamble’s reference
to the Supremacy of God signified that “the state is neither the highest
authority nor the ultimate source of rights.”134
The SCC did not base its decision in Wall on religious freedom
principles, but on a strict demarcation of the boundaries of public law.135
Religious freedom arguments register only at the periphery of the Court’s
judgment.136 However, if one steps back from the details of Wall, one can
sense the impact of the united block of interveners that supported the
appellants’ claim. The SCC delivered a unanimous decision in favour of the
appellants in Wall—a notable exception to a long line of divided opinions
on judicial review during the period in which the decision was rendered.
It also delivered a rather black-and-white decision, which arguably
oversimplified the issue of how to demarcate the public law-private law
divide.137 Finally, whatever the details of the judgment, the foreseeable
effect of the decision in Wall was to safeguard a substantial measure
of autonomy for religious institutions. While it is difficult to identify
specific instances of intervener influence in Wall, the decision suggests
that forceful, united intervener arguments that support the position of one
principal party may contribute to that party’s success.

131. Ibid (Factum of CLF at para 1); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 4). Both citing Jane
Calderwood Norton, The Freedom of Religious Organizations (Oxford: OUP, 2016) at 29 [Norton].
132. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada at paras 2-7).
133. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC/CCRL at para 24).
134. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, ARPA at para 4).
135. Ibid at para 12-23.
136. For example, the Court acknowledged the particular justiciability concerns raised by theological
disputes, and briefly mentioned section 2(a) in the final paragraph of the decision: ibid at para 39.
137. Paul Daly, “Right and Wrong on the Scope of Judicial Review: Highwood Congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall” (2018) 31:3 Can J Admin L & Prac 339.
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c. Distinct arguments with no apparent influence
We have so far identified instances where interveners modestly influenced
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, either by offering distinct
perspectives or by echoing the submissions of the parties. However,
interveners are not always successful norm entrepreneurs. In our analysis,
we identified at least three instances where interveners made submissions
on collective religious freedom that were different from those of the
principal parties but had no demonstrable impact on the resultant SCC
decision. A first instance occurred in Ktunaxa, where the BCCLA made
a novel argument about the relationship between religious freedom
violations and the section one proportionality analysis.138 Two further
instances occurred in Loyola and TWU. In these cases, two interveners that
participate frequently in section 2(a) litigation, CLF and CCCC, raised
the controversial question of whether collective religious freedom should
be understood as a freedom possessed by the aggregate of its individual
members, or, as they claimed, as a freedom possessed by a group qua
group.139
The majority of the SCC did not address the intervener submissions
on the corporate nature of religious freedom in either Loyola or TWU.
However, the argument does appear to have piqued the interest of some
members of the Court. In Loyola, as we shall see in more detail below,
the minority outlined a test to determine whether a corporation could
claim religious freedom on its own behalf.140 In TWU (2018), Rowe J’s
concurring judgment rejected the view that institutional religious freedom
could “extend beyond [the rights] held by the individual members of the
faith community.”141 By contrast, the dissenting judges suggested that
collective religious freedom “requires more” than the aggregation of
individual rights claims, but stopped short of offering a full view on the
matter.142
4. Intervener influence on collective religious freedom doctrine: The
counter-narratives
While the dominant narrative in the collective religious freedom
jurisprudence is one of modest intervener influence, a number of significant
138. Ktunaxa, supra note 50 (Factum of the Intervener, BCCLA at para 26-28).
139. Loyola, supra note 39 (Factum of the Intervener, CLF at para 4); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener,
CCCC at para 6); LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at para 34).
140. Loyola, supra note 38 at para 100.
141. LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 at para 219 (per Rowe J).
142. Ibid at 315 (citing Loyola in claiming that ensuring full protection for the “constitutionally
protected communal aspects of religious beliefs and practice” requires more than simply aggregating
individual rights claims under the amorphous umbrella of an institution’s “community”).
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counter-narratives render the picture more complex. At one end of the
spectrum, we see a few cases in which interveners succeeded in having
turns of phrase from their written submissions reproduced in minority
SCC judgments, planting specific normative and rhetorical “seeds” that
may be harvestable in a later case. At the other end of the spectrum, we
see a few cases in which the SCC developed the section 2(a) doctrine in
the absence of any on-point submissions by either the interveners or the
principal parties. We discuss instances of the former phenomenon in this
section, and instances of the latter in the next.
a. Court reproduces intervener language
We have seen that, in Loyola, interveners elaborated the submissions of
the principal parties on collective religious freedom generally, and on
whether institutions enjoy religious freedom in their own right. While these
intervener submissions only modestly influenced the majority judgment,
two interventions had a more direct impact on the concurring minority
judgment of McLachlin CJ and Moldaver J.
Table 2 details two instances where the concurring judgment reproduces
language from the intervener factums of the Catholic Civil Rights League
Coalition, and, to a lesser extent, the CCLA. The first instance addresses
the relationship between the collective and individual aspects of religious
freedom. The second addresses the (proposed) modified test for an alleged
violation of the section 2(a) freedoms of a corporation.
The parties to Loyola did not address the issue of a “corporate” section
2(a) test before the SCC. However, the Catholic Civil Rights League
Coalition did, arguing that while the standard section 2(a) test asks whether
the claimant sincerely holds a belief that has a nexus with religion, the
“corporate” section 2(a) test should ask whether the “corporation’s purpose
includes the exercise of that religious belief.”143 The Coalition proposed
that this assessment be based on several non-exhaustive criteria, “such
as the corporation’s mandate or purpose, its functions and the faith of its
officers or directors.”144 The CCLA offered a similar argument, submitting
that “Courts should focus on the existence of evidence as to the primary
or overriding object of the corporation.”145 As Table 2 demonstrates, these
submissions bear a very strong resemblance to the minority’s holding.
Since the parties made no submissions on this point, we may identify
these arguments as instances of successful norm entrepreneurship: distinct
143. Loyola, supra note 38 (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at para 32).
144. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCRL at paras 31-32).
145. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA at para 29); see also ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCLA
at paras 24-25).
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intervener arguments that substantially influenced a concurring minority
judgment of the Court.
Table 2: Intervener Submissions and Minority Loyola Judgment Compared
Intervener Submissions

Minority judgment

Catholic Civil
Rights League
Group

“the collective aspects of the freedom
of religion are intertwined with its
individual aspects” (para 18)

the “individual and collective aspects
of freedom of religion are indissolubly
intertwined” (para 94)

Catholic Civil
Rights League
Group

A corporation can claim section 2(a)
protection where the “corporation’s
purpose includes the exercise of a
belief having a nexus with religion”
(para 32)
“Courts should focus on the existence
of evidence as to the primary or
overriding object of the corporation”
(para 29)

an organization can claim section
2(a) protection “if (1) it is constituted
primarily for religious purposes, and
(2) its operation accords with these
religious purposes” (para 100)

Cdn Civil Liberties
Association

The recent TWU (2018) decision offers a second (counter-)example
of significant intervener influence on a minority decision. In this case,
intervener submissions addressing institutional religious freedom
substantially influenced the concurring decision of Justice Rowe. The
parties in TWU (2018) did not fully canvass the question of whether and
on what basis corporate institutions enjoy religious freedom. TWU and its
co-litigant simply asserted that TWU enjoyed such freedom, and that its
membership criteria were an expression of its institutional beliefs.146 The
Law Society of British Columbia did not directly challenge the appellants’
argument that institutions can themselves enjoy religious freedom, even
referring to “TWU’s sincere religious beliefs” in its written submissions.147
A number of interveners stepped into the void left by the principal
parties, making detailed submissions on the existence and nature of
institutional religious freedom. Several interveners argued in favour of
institutional religious freedom.148 However, others opposed the extension
of religious freedom to institutions. The BC Humanist Association, for
example, asserted that such an extension would have “significant and
deleterious effects on Canadians and Canadian society” including “statetolerated religious preferences for access to such necessities as education,
medical care and employment.”149 It submitted that organizations cannot

146. Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33 (Factum of the
Appellant at paras 66-67, 78).
147. LSBC v TWU, supra note 18 (Factum of the Appellant at para 163, 165).
148. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CCCC at paras 7, 17-18, 31, 34). See also ibid (Factum of the
Intervener, International Coalition of Professors of Law at para 4); Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC
et al at para 12).
149. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, BC Humanist Association at para 4).
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logically possess rights of religious freedom, that allowing leadership of
religious organizations to define the group’s religious interests would result
in a “Charter-protected religious oligarchy,” and that individual religious
and associative freedoms are sufficient to meet the goal of protecting
collective aspects of religious freedom.150 The United Church of Canada
and Faith Fealty and Creed Society similarly submitted that freedom of
conscience and religion belongs to individuals, not institutions.151 The
Canadian Secular Alliance submitted that if institutions enjoy freedom of
religion, then they do so “only to the extent that it gives effect to individual
religious freedom.”152
We have seen that the majority of the SCC did not resolve the debate
about the religious freedom of institutions in TWU, leaving aside the
university’s constitutional status and proceeding on the basis that the
decision of the law societies limited the religious freedom of “members
of the TWU community.”153 By contrast, Rowe J specifically declined to
find that TWU, as an institution, possessed section 2(a) rights.154 In his
concurring judgment, he also noted that even if TWU did possess such rights,
“these would not extend beyond those held by the individual members of
the faith community.”155 Since only interveners made arguments against
recognizing institutional religious freedom, it is reasonable to infer that
interveners influenced Rowe J’s judgment on this point.
This inference is strengthened by the degree of similarity between
Rowe J’s judgment and the factum of the Canadian Secular Alliance. The
Alliance made submissions on the scope of the protection provided by
section 2(a), the proper characterization of the religious belief for which the
claimants were seeking protection, and the nature of institutional religious
freedom. Justice Rowe accepted several of these submissions in whole or
in part, as illustrated by Table 3. Within the cases in our sample set, this is
the most striking instance of a distinct intervener argument substantially
influencing a concurring judgment of the Court.

150. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, BC Humanist Association at para 12, 38, 26 respectively).
151. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, United Church of Canada at para 24). The FFC submitted that
the protection extended to “individuals and groups”: see ibid (Factum of the Intervener, FFC at paras
25-33).
152. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, CSA at paras 21 [emphasis in original]).
153. Ibid at para 61.
154. Ibid at para 219.
155. Ibid.
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Table 3: Intervener Submissions and Concurring TWU 2018 Judgment
Compared
Submissions of the Intervener, Canadian Secular Alliance
“Where the protection of s 2(a) is claimed for an activity
or practice that restrains or prescribes the conduct of nonbelievers, or otherwise involves a belief that others must
behave in a certain way, it falls outside the scope of the right”
(para 11)
“a right designed to shield individuals from religious coercion
cannot be used as a sword to coerce religious practice” (para
11)

Judgment of Rowe J
“Where the protection of s 2(a) is sought for a belief or practice that
constrains the conduct of nonbelievers…the claim falls outside the
scope of the freedom” (para 239)

“[Religious freedom] does not extend to allow a person
to impose on the personal choices and religious beliefs of
another… It would be antithetical to the philosophy underlying
s. 2(a) to recognize a claim that requires non-believers to
adhere to
or refrain from a particular set of religious beliefs or to act
contrary to their own beliefs.” (para 13)

“Section 2(a) [does not protect] such a right to impose adherence to
religious practices on those who do not voluntarily adhere thereto”
(para 242)

“a right designed to shield individuals from religious coercion
cannot be used as a sword to coerce [conformity to] religious
practice” (para 251 – direct quote of CSA factum)

“[Section 2(a)] does not protect measures by which an individual
or faith community seeks to impose adherence to their religious
beliefs or practices on others who do not share their underlying
faith” (para 251)
“If institutions enjoy freedom of religion, then they do so only “If TWU did possess [section 2(a) rights as an institution], these
to the extent that it gives effect to individual religious freedom” would not extend beyond those held by the individual members of
(para 21)
the faith community.”
“The study of secular, Canadian law is not a religious activity” “The religious education of children involves the transmission of
(para 22)
religious beliefs; the legal education of adults does not”. (para 250)

b. Court develops new test on something no one argued
A different type of counter-narrative about the relationship between
interventions and judicial decisions emerges from the SCC decisions in
Hutterian Brethren and Ktunaxa. We have seen that it is not uncommon
for parties and interveners to make submissions on a point that the Court
declines to address. Sometimes, the Court makes an important holding on
a point that was not addressed by any intervener or party.
We have noted that Hutterian Brethren produced a significant
development in the doctrine of collective religious freedom, with the
majority holding that a law’s effects on a community should be considered
in the proportionality analysis rather than in the initial analysis of whether
there was a violation of section 2(a). The respondents in Hutterian Brethren
had challenged Alberta legislation that implemented a mandatory photo
requirement for all driver’s licences. The Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony argued that the requirement interfered with their belief that the
Second Commandment prohibits the capture of one’s image, and with
their communal way of life. The appellant, Alberta’s Attorney General,
had conceded throughout the litigation that the legislation infringed the
Colony’s religious freedom. Accordingly, the arguments mainly focused
on whether the infringement was justified. However, no party made
specific submissions addressing which stage of the doctrinal analysis
was appropriate for the consideration of the law’s effects on a religious
collectivity.156 The closest argument on point is by one set of interveners,
156. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 49 (Factum of the Appellant at para 96-97). Essentially, the AG
argued that the burdens the law imposed on the community were not religious burdens, and thus
should be considered apart from the right of any member of the community to object to having their
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which argued that once a communal religious freedom infringement is
found, this should infuse the section 1 analysis.157
Despite the absence of argument directly on point, both the majority
and the dissenting opinions addressed the relevance of the individual and
collective aspects of religious freedom at different stages of the Charter
analysis.158 The majority judgment that upheld the legislation, characterized
the essential claim as one by “individual claimants for photofree licences,”
not as an assertion of a group right.159 The majority concluded that the
law’s impact on the Hutterian Brethren community was relevant, but only
in connection with the court’s assessment of the law’s proportionality,
not in connection with the infringement of religious freedom.160 Justice
Abella dissented, finding that the initial section 2(a) claim engaged both
the individual and group aspects of religious freedom.161
The absence of party and intervener submissions on important
doctrinal matters is even more striking in Ktunaxa. In Part 4.a, we
suggested that intervener submissions on the collective dimensions of
non-Western religions modestly influenced the concurring judgment of
Moldaver J. However, the majority judgment shows no comparable signs
of intervener influence on this theme. Indeed, an important lesson from
Ktunaxa concerns the limits of intervener influence (and, indeed, party
influence), as the majority judgment turns on a novel point of law not
addressed in any participant’s written argument.
The claimants in Ktunaxa, as we have seen, argued that a ministerial
decision to approve the construction of a ski resort on lands occupied
by Grizzly Bear Spirit would drive the Spirit from their territory. The
governmental decision would constrain or destroy a communal dimension
of their religion, and thereby violate their section 2(a) rights.162
The majority accepted that freedom of religion has a communal
aspect. However, the majority stated that those communal aspects “do not,
and should not, extend s. 2(a)’s protection beyond the freedom to have
beliefs and the freedom to manifest them.”163 Specifically, the protection
photo taken. This is consistent with the doctrinal outcome of the case, but does not go so far as to make
the categorical argument that communal impacts should only be considered at the justification stage
of analysis for all cases.
157. Ibid (Factum of the Intervener, EFC at para 27).
158. Ibid at para 31.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid at para 130 (Abella J, dissenting). See also the dissenting opinion of LeBel J, which focused
on the importance of religions relationships.
162. Ktunaxa, supra note 50 at paras 73.
163. Ibid at paras 74-75.
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of section 2(a) of the Charter did not extend to the “spiritual focal point of
worship.” Since the Ktunaxa were asking the Court to protect the presence
of Grizzly Bear Spirit rather than their freedom to believe in Grizzly
Bear Spirit or pursue practices related to it, their claim fell outside the
parameters of section 2(a).164
This aspect of the majority’s reasoning significantly alters the religious
freedom terrain, in ways that have generated discussion and criticism from
multiple quarters.165 The holding that section 2(a) does not protect the
spiritual focal point of worship is likely to have important implications,
particularly for Indigenous spirituality. In this context, it is striking that
there were no written submissions on point, such that the argument was
not subject to the full force of the adversarial process. Alison Latimer
argues that courts should refrain from commenting on issues that are not
framed by the parties.166 Ktunaxa reminds us that courts do not always
limit themselves in this way and that the participants in these constitutional
conversations do not all have an equal voice. Courts retain the power to base
their rulings on arguments not raised by litigants. This limits interveners’
(and parties’) influence, though it may also free interveners to make bolder
arguments, since it reinforces that they are not ultimately responsible for
the outcome of the case or the shape of the law.
Conclusion
Interveners have had modest success in influencing the development of
Canada’s religious freedom doctrine. While the doctrinal framework for
section 2(a) has not shifted radically in response to intervener submissions,
interveners have impacted several SCC decisions—either by exposing
the Court to novel materials or ideas, or by elaborating and reinforcing
the submissions of the principal parties. Interveners have had a more
pronounced impact on a few minority judgments, in particular contributing
to the formulation of a “corporate” religious freedom test that could one
day become the law. Our findings are generally consistent with Alarie
and Green’s quantitative findings; they too found that interveners had a
measurable, but far from overwhelming, influence on the Court.

164. Ibid.
165. Howard Kislowicz & Senwung Luk, “Ktunaxa Nation: On the ‘Spiritual Focal Point of Worship’
Test” (7 November 2017), online (blog): ABlawg <ablawg.ca> [perma.cc/6JC2-Q9HL]; Kent
Williams, “How the Charter Can Protect Indigenous Spirituality; Or, the Supreme Court’s Missed
Opportunity in Ktunaxa Nation” (2019) 77:1 UT Fac L Rev 1; Kristopher Kinsinger, “Ktunaxa Nation
v British Columbia (Part 1): Religious Freedom and Objects of Worship” (16 November 2017), online
(blog): TheCourt.ca <www.thecourt.ca> [perma.cc/S8PD-9M24].
166. Alison Latimer, “Constitutional Conversations” (2019) 88:1 SCLR (2d) 231 at 231-232.
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A significant finding of this study is that intervener submissions are
not always consistent with the established purpose of intervention. The
SCC Rules require interveners to make arguments that they believe will be
different from those of the principal parties and prohibit interveners from
taking a position on the outcome of an appeal. Despite these rules, we
observed a high rate of intervener submissions that echoed or elaborated
the party arguments. We also observed that such echo arguments can be
influential. Echo arguments appear to be particularly effective where all
the interveners line up on one side of the dispute, and where there are no
competing rights to be balanced.
While interveners have enjoyed some success as norm entrepreneurs
in religious freedom cases, our study also highlights that courts enjoy a
great deal of control over the development of constitutional norms. We see
this in the modesty of most of the intervener contributions to the section
2(a) case law and in the Court’s occasional practice of developing legal
doctrine in the absence of any adversarial argument. Interveners have a
seat at the table in conversations about constitutional norms. Ultimately,
however, they are like other entrepreneurs: the Court may choose to accept
or reject their wares.
Finally, our study points to questions that call for further research
and consideration. Do non-governmental interveners influence courts
in a different way than government interveners? Do interveners play a
different role in religious freedom cases than in other Charter cases? Do
interveners improve the legitimacy of constitutional litigation, even where
their submissions have little influence on the decision that results? Further
research on these questions will help us to assess the extent to which the
benefits of intervener participation outweigh its costs.
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Appendix 1: Number of Interveners by Case and Sub-Theme

1.
Cdn Conference of Catholic Bishops Factum at para 8; CCLA Factum at para 68 TWU v BCCT.
2.
EFC Factum at paras 8, 16, 17; CCLA Factum at para 68; Cdn Conf of Catholic Bishops Factum
at para 8, TWU v BCCT; Respondent Factum para 54.
3.
Respondent Factum at para 107, TWU v BCCT.
4.
2 interveners, the EFC and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Canada, submitted a joint
factum.
5.
EFC & Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada Factum at paras 15, 21, 32; CCLA Factum at
paras 14, 23, 28, Lafontaine.
6.
CCLA Factum at para 23; EFC & Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada Factum at para 33,
Lafontaine; Appellant Factum at para 72, Resp Lafontaine Factum at para 71.
7.
CCLA Factum at para 23, Lafontaine; Appellant Factum at para 32.
8.
CCLA Factum at paras 29-30, Same-Sex Marriage Ref; United Church of Canada Factum at para
29; AG Canada Factum at para 59
9.
Seventh Day Adventist Church in Canada factum at 3; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints factum at paras 34-35; CCLA factum at paras 29-30, Same-Sex Marriage Reference.
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10. CCLA Factum at paras 29-30, Same-Sex Marriage Ref.
11. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints factum at paras 35, 39-53.
12. Appellant Factum at paras 58-61; Respondent Factum at paras 3, 69, 105; Respondent Reply
Factum at paras 3, 14.
13. CCLA Factum at para 15; EFC Factum at paras 14, 15-26, Hutterian Brethren; Appellant Factum
at para 96, Respondent Factum at paras 2, 3, 5, 14, 15, 17, 24, 28, 102, Hutterian Brethren.
14. EFC Factum at para 17, Hutterian Brethren.
15. EFC Factum at para 24, Hutterian Brethren.
16. CCCC Factum at paras 9, 11, SL.
17. CCCC Factum at para 9, SL.
18. Respondent Factum at para 77, Whatcott.
19. Loyola, CLF Factum at paras 3, 6, 27, 29; Association of Christian Educators and Schools
Canada Factum at paras 27, 34, 37; EFC Factum at para 2; Catholic Civil Rights League et al at paras
4, 11-13, 17-18, 27; CCCC Factum at paras 1, 5, 6, 8, 11-13, 14-15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26-27, 29, 30; WSO
Factum at paras 9, 10, 19-24, 33; CCLA Factum at paras 8, 11, 12, 13, 16; Appellant Factum at para
13.
20. CLF Factum at paras 4, 6, 29; Association of Christian Educators and Schools Canada Factum at
paras 19, 20, 34, 38; EFC Factum at paras 2, 12, 14, 21, 50; Corporation Archiépiscopale Catholique
Romaine de Montréal & L’Archeveque Catholique Romain de Montreal Factum at paras 1, 4-6, 9,
16-18; CCCC Factum at paras 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 19, 20, 23, 26-27, 30; WSO Factum at paras 6, 11-14,
19-24, 26-28; Faith Fealty and Creed Society Factum at paras 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10-19, 20-22, 23-24, 25-33;
Home School Legal Defence Association of Canada at para 28; CCLA Factum at paras 1, 3, 6, 19-22,
25-30; Appellant Factum at paras 46-66, 91, 95, 112; Respondent Factum at paras 99-111, 117, 119,
121, 122-125.
21. Loyola, CCCC Factum at para 23.
22. CCLA Factum at paras 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18; Association of Christian Educators and Schools
Canada Factum at paras 27, 32; CCCC Factum at para 8; Corporation Archiepiscopale Catholique
Romaine de Montréal et al Factum at para 18, Loyola.
23. Catholic Civil Rights League et al Factum at para 12, Saguenay.
24. Canadian Secular Alliance Factum at para 7; Catholic Civil Rights Leage et al Factum at para 12.
25. EFC Factum at paras 7, 10, 28-30; Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council at paras 15-19, 22,
25-29, 33-48; AG Canada at para 20; Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association et al at para 11; Central
Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance at para 1, Ktunaxa; Appellant at paras 27, 41, 65.
26. Ktunaxa, BCCLA Factum at paras 26, 28; AG Canada at para 20.
27. Ktunaxa, EFC Factum at paras 28-30; Cdn Muslim Lawyers Association et al factum at para 16.
28. EFC Factum at paras 2, 3-14, 17, 19-20, 23, 30, 34-35; CCCC Factum at paras 18-21, 28-29;
Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association at para 8; CLF Factum at para 13, Seventh-Day Adventist
Church in Canada Factum at para 17; WSO Factum at paras 35-39, Wall; Appellant Factum at paras
13, 14, 23, 47, 63, 71, 76.
29. EFC Factum at para 27; CLF Factum at paras 8, 10, Wall.
30. Wall, CCCC Factum at para 25.
31. EFC Factum at paras 13, 24, 32, 43; Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms Factum at paras
5, 8-9; BCCLA Factum at paras 43-51; Canadian Constitution Foundation at paras 2, 13023, 27-29;
CCCC Factum at paras 18-21; CLF Factum at paras 1, 9, 15, Wall; Appellant Factum at para 75.
32. EFC Factum at paras 2, 31; Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms Factum at para 13;
Association for Reformed Political Action Canada Factum at paras 4, 10-11, 13, 19, 29; BCCLA
Factum at paras 4-5, 8-12, 17, 27, 32. 43-48, 49-51; Canadian Constitution Foundation at paras 2, 2426, 30-31; Canadian Constitution Foundation Factum at paras 4, 7, 12, 26; Canadian Muslim Lawyers
Association Factum at paras 36-37; CLF Factum at paras 1, 3, 14, 16, 18-32; Seventh Day Adventist
Church in Canada Factum at para 10; WSO Factum at paras 2, 5, 42-43, 45, Wall. Appellant Factum
at paras 54, 56, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 75, 76, 99; Respondent Factum at paras 31, 33, 51-58, 74-81, Wall.
33. BC Humanist Association Factum at para 9; CCCC Factum at paras 7, 12, 29, 30, 32; EFC
Factum at paras 2, 7, 10, 11; International Coalition of Professors of Law Factum at para 4; National
Coalition of Catholic Trustees Association at paras 26, 27-31, 35; Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Vancouver et al Factum paras 10, 21. Appellants TWU Factum at paras 72, 165; Respondents LSUC
Factum at paras 80-81, 125, 133; Appellants TWU Reply Factum at paras 33, 39, 45, 46, 63; Appellant

36 The Dalhousie Law Journal
LSBC Factum at paras 21, 165, 168; Respondent TWU Factum at paras 8, 11, 104, 109, 110, 112-115.
34. BC Humanist Association Factum at paras 3, 4, 5, 9 -17, 21-27, 28-39, 40-48; CCCC Factum
at paras 17, 18, 23-27, 31, 32, 36; Canadian Secular Alliance Factum at paras 20-21; EFC Factum at
paras 12, 28, 29, 31; Faith, Fealty & Creed Society Factum at paras 8, 17-24, 25-37; International
Coalition of Professors of Law Factum at para 24; National Coalition of Catholic Trustees Association
at paras 29-31; Roman Catholic Archidiocese of Vancouver et al Factum at paras 10, 22; Appellants
TWU Factum at paras 66-67; 78, 91, 165; Appellants TWU Reply Factum at paras 3, 33, 39, 46, 63;
Respondents TWU Factum at paras 8, 11, 96, 104, 110, 112-115, 162.
35. CCCC Factum at para 34.
36. EFC Factum at para 6; International Coalition of Professors of Law Factum at paras 18-24;
National Coalition of Catholic Trustees Association at paras 30, 35; Appellants TWU Factum at para
95; Appellants TWU Reply Factum at para 45; Appellant LSBC Factum at para 21; Respondents TWU
Factum at para 104;
37. CCCC Factum at paras 7, 12, 17, 18, 35; EFC Factum at para 8; Respondents LSUC Factum at
paras 125, 133; Appellants TWU Reply Factum at para 3; Respondents TWU Factum at paras 107,
162.

